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South Korea today is a bitterly divided country. Clashes between
conservatives (posu) and progressives (chinbo) over everything from the di-
rection of economic and political reforms to the location of the nation’s
capital have created a deep domestic fissure. The rift has become especially
pronounced and acrimonious since the election of President Roh Moo-hyun
in December 2002. In the two years since assuming office, Roh, a progres-
sive, has been relentlessly criticized and opposed by the conservatives. He
was even impeached by the opposition in the National Assembly, his presi-
dency saved only when the Constitutional Court overturned the motion.1
Roh, in turn, has taken every opportunity to challenge, threaten, and
taunt the conservatives. Roh’s Uri party recently proposed a law that would
limit the circulation of the major conservative dailies. It is also trying to pass
a law that would seek to identify and punish those who “collaborated” with
the Japanese during the colonial period, such as former president Park Chung-
hee, an officer in the Japanese Imperial army before liberation, whose daugh-
ter now happens to lead the opposition, and with the past authoritarian
regimes, which includes most members of the opposition. In addition, the
progressives are trying to abolish the 50-year-old National Security Law that
the staunchly anti-Communist conservatives consider indispensable to guard
against North Korean espionage and infiltration. The government has even
tried to move the capital of the country farther south, to Yonki Prefecture in
North Ch’ungch’ong Province, in an apparent attempt to escape Seoul, over
which the conservative establishment is said to have a chokehold. The plan
was dealt a severe blow when, on October 21, 2004, the Constitutional
Court declared that such a move was unconstitutional and would require
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approval through a national referendum. The government is still trying,
however, to relocate many government ministries and offices.2
Yet, the most contentious and ideologically charged issue with conse-
quences far beyond the confines of South Korea’s domestic political arena is
the effort on the part of the progressive government to redefine the country’s
relationship with North Korea on one hand and the United States on the
other. In this country, traditionally one of the closest U.S. allies and a bas-
tion of anticommunism, a growing segment of the population has been turn-
ing anti-American and pro–North Korean. Roh himself was elected on a
wave of anti-American sentiment precipitated by the June 2002 deaths of
two South Korean schoolgirls, run over by a U.S. armored personnel carrier
on exercise. If the South Korean government in the past invariably took the
harder line when dealing with the North while the United States played a
restraining role, now the roles have reversed, as Washington tries to pres-
sure, sanction, and punish the North for its behavior while Seoul tries to en-
gage and embrace it.
Some observers try to explain away anti-American and pro–North Korean
views in South Korea as a largely harmless sign of the country’s maturity, a
manifestation of an effort to steer a more independent course in foreign
policy vis-à-vis the United States. Others say that the changes in views are
a reflection of the country’s democratization, of increasing pluralism and di-
versity of opinion. Still others defend this shift by saying that it is a protest
against the unilateralism of the current Bush administration and not against
the United States itself. In reality, anti-American and pro–North Korean at-
titudes in South Korea are anything but passing trends or transitory reac-
tions to a particular U.S. policy or administration, nor can one cheerfully
dismiss them as signs of a maturing democracy. Rather, they are the logical
extension of the current ruling coalition’s “leftist-nationalist” ideology, which
lies at the root of South Korea’s deep division between conservatives and
progressives. What, then, is the origin, nature, and potential future influ-
ence of this ideology that harbors an increasingly virulent form of anti-
Americanism while coddling North Korea’s regime?
Conservative Nation-Building
In 1965, South Korea had a per capita income of $81, with 85 percent of its
population living in rural areas in abject poverty. It had barely survived
harsh colonial rule, devastating civil war, dictatorship, and coup d’etat. Just
30 years later, its per capita income had risen to more than $10,000. Today,
South Korea has the 12th-largest economy in the world. Nearly 90 percent
of South Koreans live in bustling urban centers, while the country boasts the
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world’s highest percentage of households wired to high-speed Internet ser-
vices. It also enjoys a vibrant democracy consolidated through successful
elections and political reforms.
Because South Korea met the twin goals of industrialization and democ-
ratization so quickly, it is easy to forget that they were spearheaded by two
very different political coalitions, the conservatives and the liberals, locked
in a fierce struggle for decades. Although Park Chung-hee (1961–1979) and
Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988) were the architects of South Korea’s eco-
nomic miracle, they were also the dictators
who brutalized the opposition led by the likes
of Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) and Kim Dae-
jung (1998–2003), the champions of democ-
racy. The two Kims and their followers never
let up their challenge to the authoritarian
rule of Park and Chun despite their obvious
success in engineering economic growth. For
both sides, however, industrialization and de-
mocratization were by and large shared goals.
No one disputed the urgency of undertaking
economic development. As for democracy, even the conservative authoritar-
ian leaders always felt compelled at least to pay it lip service. Where the two
sides differed was on priorities. The industrialization-first coalition wanted
to delay democracy until the country was strong militarily and economically.
The pro-democracy leaders disagreed. From the early 1960s to the late
1980s, the military and the conservative coalition that went along with it
settled the debate.
Having experienced colonial exploitation, poverty, and the destruction of
the Korean War, this industrialization-first coalition was determined to pur-
sue economic development at all cost. For the sake of national security,
which to them meant the prevention of another North Korean invasion,
they became staunchly anti-Communist, while political, economic, and mili-
tary mobilization became the order of the day. In the name of efficiency,
productivity, and national security, human rights were given short shrift and
democratic procedures were ignored. This coalition regarded the United
States as South Korea’s “savior” and ally, welcoming, indeed insisting on,
the continued presence of U.S. troops on its soil. The alliance between the
United States and the Republic of Korea did become strained at times, such
as during the 1970s because of the lack of progress in human rights and de-
mocracy.3  The raison d’etre of the alliance itself, however, was never ques-
tioned, at least not by Seoul, and neither side doubted that North Korea was
the common enemy.
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Starting in the late 1980s, South Korea began making a dramatic transi-
tion to democracy. In 1987 the country held its first free and direct presiden-
tial election in 20 years. The elections during the 1990s of Kim Young-sam and
Kim Dae-jung consolidated the South Korean democracy. During this pe-
riod, the military establishment, as well as the collusive ties between gov-
ernment and business forged by the authoritarian governments of the past,
became targets of reform. The two Kims continued to place high importance
on South Korea’s alliance with the United States. For both, the United
States was more than just a military ally or provider of economic aid and,
later, markets. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were beneficiaries of U.S.
protection during their long years of struggle against the authoritarian gov-
ernments. The United States had provided moral support as well as diplo-
matic pressure at crucial moments to save them from grievous harm. U.S.
intervention twice saved Kim Dae-jung’s life, after South Korea’s own Korea
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents kidnapped him in Tokyo in 1971
and again when a court-martial sentenced him to death in 1980.
In the end, under conservative and then liberal leadership, South Korea
had the best of both worlds. The country first went through successful in-
dustrialization under a conservative military dictatorship and then built up
its democratic institutions when the liberal leaders of the pro-democracy
movement took over. Both sides, each in its own way, regarded the United
States as their benefactor. This is the South Korea that Washington had
come to know and expect.
The Roots of Leftist Nationalism
Roh’s election in 2002 marked the rise of the progressives in South Korean
politics. The progressives consist of those politicians, intellectuals, and stu-
dents who formed a coalition against military dictatorship during the 1980s.
Yet, their worldview was vastly different from that of the earlier generation of
pro-democracy fighters. If the ideals of liberal democracy inspired the earlier
generation, the contradictions of capitalism created by South Korea’s rapid in-
dustrialization during the 1960s and 1970s galvanized the progressives into
action. As witnesses to the destruction of rural areas, they formed a deep an-
tipathy to industrialization and urbanization. As they saw workers toil under
inhuman conditions while living in ever expanding shantytowns around major
cities, they came to regard capitalism as a dehumanizing system.
When such a deeply flawed system did not collapse despite the weight of
its own contradictions and their own unceasing struggle, the progressives
began searching for a deeper structural cause. What they purported to dis-
cover was the United States propping up a string of dictators in South Korea
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for its own “imperial” and “hegemonic” interests on the peninsula and in the
region. They also believed that they could trace the source of current mala-
dies afflicting South Korea as far back as the Japanese colonial period
(1910–1945) when Korea underwent forced modernization. Colonial indus-
trialization not only skewed the industrial structure of Korea as a dependent
economy of the Japanese empire, but also created a Korean bourgeois class
that prospered by collaborating with the colonial masters.4
Here the crucial link between leftism and nationalism is revealed. Given the
capitalist nature of the Japanese empire, to be a true nationalist meant being
not only anti-Japanese, but also anti-capitalist. Some rightist, or bourgeois, na-
tionalists claimed that one could be both na-
tionalist and capitalist; but the leftists, who
believed they were the only true nationalists,
sought to evict the Japanese themselves as well
as the capitalist system they had left behind.
According to the progressives, then, leftist
nationalism should have been Korea’s guiding
ideology after liberation in 1945. It failed to
emerge, however, when the United States im-
posed direct military rule in South Korea dur-
ing 1945–1947 and backed the establishment of a capitalist regime in 1948
and Cold War anticommunism began to overwhelm nationalism.5  Most pro-
Japanese collaborators went unpunished by the pro-U.S. capitalists because
the newly installed government needed their help in fighting the Commu-
nists and in setting up a pro-U.S. regime in South Korea.6
The system became even more reactionary when Park, a former Japanese Im-
perial Army officer, seized power through a military coup in 1961. He hurriedly
established formal diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, scarcely 20 years af-
ter the occupation ended. Even though Japan provided as reparations an aid
package totaling $800 million, which the South Korean government invested in
strategic industries that later became the mainstay of the country’s economic
might, many viewed the hasty normalization of relations as a sellout.
In 1966, Park committed South Korean troops to the Vietnam War, be-
coming a U.S. “mercenary.” Although the war proved pivotal for South
Korea’s economic growth as well as for upgrades to its military capability, the
progressives saw it as a clear illustration of South Korea’s less than indepen-
dent status vis-à-vis the United States. In 1980, Chun Doo-hwan grabbed
power in the vacuum created in the aftermath of Park’s assassination the
prior year, first through a coup d’etat and then through the bloody suppres-
sion of the Kwangju Democracy Movement, in which citizens of South Cholla
province’s capital rose up in protest against military dictatorship. Although
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Chun rose to power in a brutal manner to perpetuate the system created by
Park, the fact that the United States stood by, albeit haplessly, only con-
firmed the progressives’ view of South Korea as a militarist, capitalist, impe-
rialist enclave under U.S. control.
Although the earlier generation of South Korean dissidents focused on
the undemocratic nature of the authoritarian regimes, the progressives chose
to focus on its antinationalistic character. For them, South Korea’s problems
derived not so much from the delay in democratization and mismanagement
of industrialization but from the perception that these were the wrong goals
with which to begin. Industrialization, in their view, was a capitalist-imperi-
alist imposition to exploit South Korea’s oppressed minjung (peasants and
the proletariat).7  Liberal democracy was a political system meant to per-
petuate the class interests of the bourgeois that came to dominate South
Korea with U.S. backing.
Once the roots of progressive ideology are understood, it becomes simple
to see its natural link with pro–North Korean attitudes. Unlike the South,
North Korea thoroughly purged the Japanese collaborators, many of whom
then fled to the South. North Korea confiscated land from the landlords and
redistributed it to the people. It steered an independent course in foreign
policy between Beijing and Moscow during the Cold War and did not allow
foreign troops on its soil, nor did it compromise with Japan. North Korea
even seemed to be holding its own against the sole remaining superpower,
the United States. For many progressives, North Korea stood for everything
that the South did not: nationalism, anticapitalism, and anti-imperialism.
The Rise of the Progressives
Until the mid-1990s, such views were confined to the radical fringe of South
Korea’s intellectual and political spectrum. The financial crisis that crippled
the South Korean economy in 1997, however, provided the opening through
which the progressives and their ideology could enter South Korea’s political
mainstream. The crisis exposed the bankruptcy of the old system in more ways
than one. The progressives had always argued that South Korea’s political and
economic system was illegitimate and morally bankrupt. The financial crisis
revealed that even the vaunted economic system was hopelessly inefficient.
One of the most direct political consequences of the financial crisis,
dubbed the “IMF [International Monetary Fund] crisis” in South Korea, was
the election of Kim Dae-jung, longtime dissident and opposition leader, to
the presidency in 1997. Despite Kim Dae-jung’s uncontested standing as a
leader of the pro-democracy movement, two factors had prevented him from
being elected president. One was the fact that he was a son of Honam, the
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southwestern region with a population much smaller than the Yongnam re-
gion that had produced four out of seven presidents to date. In a political
system riven with primitive regionalist sentiments, Kim Dae-jung’s election
under normal circumstances was nearly impossible.
The second factor was the belief among the conservative segment of the
South Korean electorate that he held dangerously leftist views. Indeed,
Kim Dae-jung advocated an economic policy that emphasized welfare in-
stead of growth. He also made it abundantly
clear that, if he were elected president, he
would adopt a much more conciliatory ap-
proach toward North Korea than previous
leaders. The financial crisis created wide-
spread panic and disgust among the popula-
tion with the ruling conservative coalition’s
corrupt ion and mismanagement  o f  the
economy, providing the opportunity for Kim
Dae-jung to surmount his handicap.
For the first time, the presidency passed to an opposition candidate as the
electorate seemingly overcame regionalism and conservatism. Progressives
were heartened enough to decide to join the mainstream political process.
Given their experience in organization, propaganda, and political mobiliza-
tion—skills finely honed during their struggles against the authoritarian
governments—many of them successfully transitioned to electoral politics.
Kim Dae-jung, who needed to build a new political coalition to push through
his “radical” policies, actively supported the endeavors of the radical
progressives to join the political process. Many South Koreans, even those
who disagreed with the progressives’ worldview, also welcomed this infusion
of new blood into a political system long since dominated by corrupt strag-
glers from the authoritarian years.
The new ruling coalition led by Kim Dae-jung and former radical student
leaders of the “386 Generation,” so-called because their core members were in
their 30s, were college students during the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s,
began introducing South Korea to many ideas and policies that were once
considered too leftist and hence taboo. The two most important in this regard
were the anti-chaebol reforms and the “sunshine policy” toward North Korea.
THE ANTI-CHAEBOL REFORMS
For the progressives, South Korea’s chaebols, the infamous conglomerates
that grew and prospered under preferential treatment meted out to them by
authoritarian governments, represented the worst form of worker exploita-
tion, led by a handful of capitalists and backed by the reactionary military
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and U.S. imperialists. As such, they had to be dismantled and replaced with
a more equitable distribution of wealth, supported by a welfare system. Given
the power of the chaebol, such measures would have been impossible under
normal circumstances. Yet, the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis,
were not normal times.
The Kim Dae-jung administration’s anti-chaebol reforms were reasonably
successful because they initially received support from two very different
constituencies: the workers whom Kim Dae-jung and the progressives repre-
sented, and the IMF, which, in exchange for
the emergency bridge loan that it provided
South Korea in 1997, came to dictate the
economic policy of the country. Both the
workers and the IMF had a common interest
in weakening the power of the chaebols and
cutting the close government-business ties
that had been the hallmark of the South Ko-
rean economic system. The workers opposed
the chaebols because they wanted a larger
share of the pie that they had helped create.
The IMF, on the other hand, wanted to dismantle the system according to
its structural adjustment policies to make the South Korean economy more
market friendly.
In the end, the IMF policy was enforced. Despite his intentions and con-
trary to the expectations of the progressives who initially supported him,
Kim Dae-jung’s reforms turned out to be more pro-market than those of any
previous South Korean president. The workers realized too late that the re-
forms were not benefiting them. The destruction of the chaebols also meant
the weakening or disintegration of the huge labor organizations that formed
to struggle against the chaebols. Nevertheless, domestically, the effort to
dismantle the chaebols and build a welfare system created an intellectual
and political atmosphere conducive to the introduction of progressive ideas
and policies into the mainstream.
THE SUNSHINE POLICY
The sunshine policy also had two constituencies: liberals and progressives.
On one hand, the policy was globally supported by liberals as a humanitar-
ian policy. The fall of Pyongyang’s patron the Soviet Union, the reluctance
of China to support North Korea’s adventurism, and the collapse of its
economy made North Korea less of a threat to the outside world than to it-
self. With millions of its people starving to death, North Korea’s system was
preoccupied with regime survival and little else. The recommended policy
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was to coax the reclusive regime out into the world and the ranks of normal
states. The best way to do this was by offering humanitarian and economic
aid, not threatening sanctions or war.
On the other hand, the engagement policy toward North Korea also fit
perfectly with the leftist-nationalist ideology of the progressives. The policy
appealed to their idea of the two Koreas: one nation divided into two states
cooperating to decide the destiny and fate of the peninsula without the in-
terference of foreign powers, the United States in particular. National rec-
onciliation meant overcoming imperialist machinations that had brought
about national division in the first place. The June 2000 summit between
Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il was a powerful illustration of the idea of na-
tional self-determination.
In the meantime, all the economic aid to the North, most of it in the
form of direct cash transfers, that was decried by the conservatives was re-
garded by the progressives as justifiable aid to brethren in dire need. Anyone
who opposed such transfers and other forms of aid to the North was branded
a “conservative reactionary.” Those who argued that it was folly to unilater-
ally declare the end of the Cold War while a massive North Korean army re-
mained poised across the 38th parallel and the regime continued to develop
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were considered warmongers. When
Bush branded North Korea as one part of the “axis of evil” in his first State
of the Union address, South Korea’s progressives were outraged. They re-
garded the Bush administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea as
typical of U.S. imperialism and obstructionism. The United States was the
greatest obstacle to national reconciliation and reunification on the Korean
peninsula.
The Limits of Progressivism
Old South Korea’s identity, based on development, authoritarianism, and
anticommunism, does not appeal to the generation younger than the 386
Generation either. The conservative opposition is little more than a rag-tag
assemblage of members of numerous former ruling coalitions with little
background or ideology in common. The fact that they were able to avoid
electoral disaster in the general election of April 2004 only by uniting under
the leadership of Park Keun-hye, the eldest daughter of former president
Park, reveals just how beholden they are to the past. In contrast, the
progressives are ideologically motivated and politically mobilized. The ideol-
ogy of welfare, egalitarianism, and national reconciliation with North Korea
clearly appeals to the liberal and younger segments of the population. Roh’s
Uri Party used his impeachment by the opposition-dominated National As-
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sembly in March 2004 as an opportunity to garner public sympathy and sup-
port. In the following month’s general election, Roh’s party was able to engi-
neer a stunning victory, going from less than 50 seats in the 299-seat National
Assembly to a majority of 151.
If the conservative opposition poses no immediate threat, however, a much
more fundamental challenge arises from the incongruity of the progressive’s
ideology with the realities of today’s South Ko-
rea. South Korea’s economic base is becoming
increasingly globalized and market oriented,
boasting one of the most consumer-oriented
economies in East Asia thanks to the easy
credit made available during the Kim Dae-
jung administration’s reforms. Many chaebols
that survived the IMF crisis and successfully
adapted to the global marketplace have be-
come the mainstay of South Korea’s increasing
economic clout and prestige in the global mar-
ket. The economy is becoming ever more tightly woven into the global capi-
talist system as South Korea continues to expand its market, having reached
free-trade agreements with Chile and Singapore and continuing to seek oth-
ers, even with its former colonial master, Japan.
South Korea’s high-technology savvy and globalized younger genera-
tion that grew up amid plenty is far more individualistic and liberal than
the 386 Generation. The radical student organizations that attracted
large numbers in the 1980s are fading from the scene. Despite this new
generation’s apparent support for Roh and the Uri party, it is too early to
discern how they will eventually come to view the country’s recent his-
tory as well as the leftist-nationalist interpretations of these events. Thus,
the progressives are governing a South Korea that is becoming increas-
ingly liberal, free-market oriented, and globalized, with little in their
ideology or past experience to guide them. How then are the progressives
able to maintain their influence?
POLITICAL SMOKE AND MIRRORS
The progressives were able to enter the political mainstream because they
were willing to make a pact with the devil by making strategic alignments
with the conservatives. Kim Dae-jung was able to win the presidency not
only because of the IMF crisis that hit South Korea in 1997, but also be-
cause he merged his political party with that of Kim Jong-pil, the master-
mind behind Park’s coup of 1961 and the founding director of the KCIA, the
very agency that abducted and almost killed Kim Dae-jung in 1971. Kim
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Jong-pil, the arch-conservative, defected to Kim Dae-jung’s camp because
he could not secure the presidential candidacy of the conservative New Ko-
rea Party, then led by President Kim Young-sam. Kim Jong-pil and Kim Dae-
jung made a pact based on the promise that the latter, once elected president,
would push through a constitutional amendment to turn South Korea’s po-
litical structure into a parliamentary system. Kim Jong-pil would then be-
come prime minister and wield the real power while Kim Dae-jung would
serve as the largely ceremonial president. Kim Dae-jung did not keep this
promise, and Kim Jong-pil broke from him in 2000.
Two years later, Roh also made a pact with conservative politician, Chung
Mong-jun, an independent who rose to national prominence as the chief or-
ganizer of the 2002 World Cup, to win his presidency. Chung, the owner of
Hyundai Heavy Industries and the son of the founder of Hyundai, one of
Korea’s foremost chaebols, sided with Roh until the night before election
day, when he dropped his support, thinking that Roh would lose the elec-
tion. To Chung’s surprise and everlasting regret, Roh won the election, free
of any obligation to him. Regardless, Roh clearly was willing to compromise
with conservatism to secure the presidency.
The progressives have successfully used political rhetoric and ideology to
manipulate the selective affinity, or confusion, between progressivism and
liberalism to its advantage. Domestically, the continuing legacy of the over-
bearing state, authoritarianism, and regimentation of all aspects of life under
the old regime continues to make any call for radical reform and dismantling
of the old system attractive to many, especially among the younger genera-
tion. From outside the country, liberals and free-marketers with little under-
standing of South Korea’s domestic political history and dynamics continue
to support the progressives’ liberal agenda.
THE LIMITS OF LEFTIST NATIONALISM
An even more important factor in the progressives’ ability to maintain their
appeal has been nationalism. As South Koreans become increasingly suc-
cessful, they are also becoming more vociferous in expressing their national
pride. The massive rallies during the national soccer team’s World Cup vic-
tories in the summer of 2002, for example, became occasions for South Ko-
reans from all walks of life to celebrate the nation’s coming of age. When
the news spread in the fall of 2002 that two schoolgirls had been killed dur-
ing U.S. troop maneuvers, however, those same people came out to mourn
the deaths and to protest the insensitive manner in which the United States
handled the case. Then, led by the progressives, these rallies were trans-
formed into anti-American rallies. The leftist nationalists had appropriated
a nationalism based on justifiable pride in the nation’s successes in achieving
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industrialization and democratization (as well as winning soccer matches) and
transformed it into anti-American sentiment.
Many South Koreans, regardless of their ideological orientation, had by
this time become critical of certain aspects of the U.S. presence in their
land, such as perceived arrogance and misbehavior on the part of U.S. troops
or unequal clauses contained in the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA), which went into ef-
fect in July 1966. Many now want to see U.S.
bases removed from what has become the choic-
est piece of real estate in the middle of Seoul.
Such sentiments play into leftist nationalists’
hands. More limited demands to remove U.S.
bases from Seoul and to amend the SOFA agree-
ment are conflated with broader calls to remove
U.S. forces from South Korea and to condemn
U.S. imperialism.
Another way in which the progressives have managed to dominate the
political agenda is by initiating a national debate on history. By applying a
crude nationalistic standard to the often troubling and complex legacy of
the Japanese colonial period, the progressives have managed to brand any-
one who had worked in almost any capacity under the Japanese rule as a
“collaborator.” This includes not only those Koreans who worked for the co-
lonial bureaucracy, police, and the military, but also industrialists, intellec-
tuals, artists, and composers. Among them, the most prominent is the late
president Park, who was a military officer in the Japanese imperial army be-
fore liberation and the father of Park Keun-hye, the current leader of the
opposition. By opening the debate on colonial history, the progressives are
trying to undercut the legitimacy of past regimes as well as the opposition.
Roh’s speech on August 15, 2004, on the occasion of the 59th Liberation
Day made clear that the rectification of history would be high on the cur-
rent government’s political agenda:
Acts of betrayal in support of imperialist Japan and colonial rule at the
same time our patriotic forefathers were staking their lives in the fight for
the nation are still hidden in the shade of history.… What is more shame-
ful is that the independence fighters who followed the right path of his-
tory and their descendants have been plagued by poverty and alienation
and have been persecuted by those who curried favor with imperialist Ja-
pan and subsequently became social leaders.
Moreover, Roh declared that an equally serious crime was “the encroach-
ment on human rights and the illegal acts perpetrated by past administra-
The challenge for
the progressives is
to overcome their
infantile leftist
nationalism.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY  SUMMER 2005
The Two South Koreas: A House Divided l
69
tions.” The president then proposed forming an “ad hoc parliamentary com-
mittee to deal comprehensively with matters that have become contentious
throughout history.”8
The issue of pro-Japanese collaborators (ch’in-il p’a) is an emotional one
for Koreans. Human rights violations during the authoritarian years is also a
painful scar on the Korean psyche. By seizing the emotional high ground
through his nationalistic and pro-democracy rhetoric while elevating history
as the main topic of political deliberation, Roh has succeeded in dominating
and leading the political agenda. The government now aims to identify and
punish those who collaborated with the Japanese during Korea’s occupation
from 1910 to 1945 and has initiated an investigation into wrongdoings by
individuals and institutions during the authoritarian years. Most recently,
the National Intelligence Service (formerly the KCIA) embarked on an in-
ternal inquiry into its own past misdeeds.9  The conservatives contend that
these moves are calculated to discredit and weaken the opposition. The gov-
ernment and the ruling coalition claim that their goal is a reconciliation
with history that will ultimately lead to a national reconciliation. Needless
to say, reconciliation seems to be the last thing that has been taking place.
The debate on history has led to a witch hunt, in which opposing sides try
to dig up past misdeeds of their political opponents’ parents and grandpar-
ents while the accused tries everything to defend the honor of his or her an-
cestors. Given that the colonial period ended some 60 years ago, few if any
of the accused traitors and collaborators are alive, let alone active in poli-
tics. The debate has therefore created bizarre cases of prominent politicians’
careers being ruined overnight when it is discovered that their parents actu-
ally worked for the Japanese colonial government rather than having been
upstanding nationalists as they had been brought up to believe. This surreal
debate has succeeded in turning every policy debate into one over family
honor. Such debates rarely if ever produce compromises and also divert the
attention and energy of the country away from addressing the pressing policy
issues it faces.
A House Divided and Damaged
South Korea’s deep division is based on radically different interpretations of
the modern nation’s birth and development. The conservatives, like much
of the rest of the world, celebrate South Korea’s industrialization and de-
mocratization despite the many compromises and shortcomings. The
progressives, in contrast, are unrelenting in their criticism of the nation’s
history despite these achievements. For the progressives who turn a critical
eye to history, South Korea reached its current state through too many com-
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promises and unjustifiable sacrifices, including dictatorship, human rights
violations, and dependence on foreign power. As such, they argue that South
Korea’s achievements cannot be considered genuine until the country has
corrected past mistakes and wrongdoings and brought to justice all those
implicated.
Just when South Korea was coming into its own, having built a vibrant
industrial economy and democracy, it has now come to be governed by a
coalition deeply suspicious of everything that made the country a success,
including its political system, economy, and
alliance with the United States. The fallout
from the resulting ideological war between the
two South Koreas has been serious. The coun-
try is now deeply divided along class, genera-
tional, and regional lines. Its economy is
suffer ing while i ts  relat ionship with the
United States is rapidly and perhaps irrepara-
bly deteriorating.
Currently, the South Korean economy is in
a deep freeze. Domestic consumption and in-
vestment are the lowest in years, lower even than during the years immedi-
ately following the 1997 financial crisis. The government’s economic policy
continues to vacillate between an ideology that calls for redistributive jus-
tice and the pro-market, pro-business reforms and policies that would make
South Korean firms more competitive and South Korea more attractive to
foreign investors. South Korean companies, deeply suspicious of the ideo-
logical motivation of the ruling coalition and afraid of the political instabil-
ity ensuing from the society’s ideological division, are refusing to invest in
the domestic economy. The only bright spot is the export sector, led by the
likes of Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and POSCO.
In the international arena, South Korea today finds itself in a corner of
the world surrounded by an increasingly powerful China, a confident Russia,
and an unpredictable and nuclear-armed North Korea, as well as a recover-
ing Japan jittery over North Korea and China. The North Korea that the
progressives try so hard to accommodate and embrace is becoming more bel-
licose, flaunting all international norms with the self-professed aim of be-
coming a nuclear power, if it has not become one already. South Korea’s
accommodating stance toward North Korea is a serious burden on South
Korea’s economy, security, and relations with allies.
It is in this context that the United States has begun reducing its military
presence in South Korea, ostensibly as part of its global strategy of military re-
deployment as well as out of the very real need for additional troops in Iraq.
Policymakers must
understand the
roots of the current
ROK government’s
policies.
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The increasing U.S. focus on fighting international terrorism, rather than sim-
ply defending South Korea for Cold War–era reasons, would have made the
justification of a continued close military alliance between the two countries
difficult enough. The ambivalent attitude of South Korea’s ruling coalition re-
garding the U.S. troop presence has only given ammunition to those in the
United States and South Korea who brashly advocate U.S. withdrawal.
The Challenges Ahead
The challenge for the progressives is to overcome their infantile leftist na-
tionalism, which is wreaking havoc on South Korea’s economy and its alli-
ance with the United States, the country’s two mainstays. What is needed is
a pragmatic turn. If the progressives are to have any hope of achieving their
oft-repeated goal of doubling the country’s per capita income by 2010, they
need to formulate economic policies that can quickly put the country back
on the path of rapid growth.
They also need to clarify their stance vis-à-vis North Korea. A clear dis-
tinction is necessary between national reconciliation based on economic
and humanitarian exchanges, on one hand, and holding North Korea ac-
countable to improve security and uphold international norms, on the other.
As things currently stand, the tense standoff between the United States and
North Korea is putting South Korea in a hopeless situation that satisfies nei-
ther ally nor brother. Moreover, the spectacle of the United Nations and the
United States officially condemning North Korea’s human rights violations
while South Korea’s government, led by a former human rights lawyer, re-
mains silent in fear of offending the North, should come to an end. Sending
troops to Iraq only after such a public and controversial debate that the
United States and its allies feel more irritated than grateful is the kind of
negative-sum game that the government needs to stop playing.
For those interested in maintaining close and constructive ties between
South Korea and the United States, the challenge is to be able to make the
sometimes fine distinction between the demands of the two South Koreas:
one increasingly successful and proud and the other dogmatically nationalist
and anti-American. To prevent further damage to the U.S.–South Korean
alliance that could have serious consequences for the two countries as well
as Northeast Asia as a whole, policymakers in each country and all others
concerned must understand the roots of the current South Korean government’s
policies toward North Korea and the United States, rather than glossing
over the glaring anomalies and frictions in the name of a staunch alliance
that is increasingly illusory. Obviously, South Korea will become increasingly
self-confident, wanting to steer its own course in foreign policy, and South
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Korea’s relations with the United States will have to evolve to reflect this
desire on the part of the Korean people while recognizing geopolitical reali-
ties. Accommodating such changes and reflecting such sentiments while
maintaining the fundamentals of the close relationship formed over the
years will be a tough act.
As of now, the conservatives show little sign of making a comeback. They
are in disarray, divided along generational, regional, and even ideological
lines. Thus, despite continuing troubles in the economy and with allies, the
progressives maintain the political upper hand. Given the economic and
geopolitical realities of South Korea, it may very well be that the progressives
will ultimately make the transition to a more pragmatic position. It may be
that only another economic or security crisis, however, can bring them around.
Such a transition cannot come too soon. In the meantime, South Korea’s
economic as well as strategic position both regionally and globally will con-
tinue to erode.
Notes
1. Samuel Len, “President’s Impeachment Stirs Angry Protests in South Korea,”
New York Times, March 13, 2004; John Larkin and Donald Macintyre, “Out of
Control,” Time Asia, March 22, 2004, http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/
article/0,13673,501040322-600938,00.html.
2. Ser Myo-ja, “Top Court Halts Capital Move,” Joongang Daily, October 22, 2004;
Jong-Heon Lee, “Analysis: South Korea’s Roh Again in Crisis,” Washington Times,
October 22, 2004.
3. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
4. Carter Eckert, Offspring of Empire: The Koch’Ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of
Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996).
5. Jang Jip Choi, “Political Cleavages in South Korea,” in State and Society in Contem-
porary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 13–
50.
6. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton,
1998), pp. 185–236.
7. For more on the minjung, see Kenneth M. Wells, “Introduction,” in South Korea’s
Minjung Movement: The Culture and Politics of Dissidence, ed. Kenneth M. Wells
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), pp. 1–9.
8. Office of the President, “Address by President Roh Moo-hyun on the 59th Anniver-
sary of National Liberation,” August 15, 2004, http://english.president.go.kr/warp/
app/en_speeches/view?group_id=en_archive&meta_id=en_speeches&id=
cb01b590fa2afd6112fe1c4&list_op=YTo3OntpOjA7czo1OiJsc3RvcCI7aTox
O3M6MTI6ImFyY2hpdmVfbGlzdCI7aToyO2E6Mjp7czo3OiJzcmNoY2F0Ijtz
OjA6IiI7czo3OiJzcmNoY29uIjtzOjA6IiI7fWk6MztzOjEzOiJyZWdpc3Rlcl9k
Y X R l I j t p O j Q 7 a To y M D t p O j U 7 a To y M D t p O j Y 7 a Tox M D t 9 & _ s s o _ i d _ =
bf363ca83154085a54106058d7945acc.
9. “Truth Probe by NIS,” Korea Herald, November 19, 2004.
